DECISÕES RACIONALMENTE ARBITRÁRIAS NO DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO

Adrian Vermeule

Resumo


Como o Direito Administrativo deve lidar com a incerteza genuína, em que as probabilidades não podem ser associadas aos resultados? Eu argumento que há uma importante categoria de decisões de agências sob incerteza na qual ser arbitrário é racional. A arbitrariedade racional surge quando nenhuma razão de primeira ordem pode fundamentar a escolha da agência, embora a agência tenha válidas razões de segunda ordem para fazer determinada escolha. Quando essas condições prevalecem, até mesmo um jogo de “cara ou coroa” pode ser uma estratégia perfeitamente racional de tomada de decisão para agências. Os tribunais devem adotar uma postura de deferência às decisões racionalmente arbitrárias. Há um papel próprio para as cortes de garantir que agências tenham recursos adequadamente investidos na coleta de informações, o que pode dissipar a incerteza. Ainda assim, o valor de investimentos adicionais na coleta de informações, em alguns casos, será genuinamente incerto. Se assim for, os tribunais devem ter deferência às escolhas de segunda ordem das agências sobre investimentos informacionais pelos mesmos fundamentos que justificam a deferência às escolhas de primeira ordem sob incerteza feitas por agências.


Palavras-chave


Agências; Incerteza; Razões de Primeira Ordem; Razões de Segunda Ordem; Arbitrariedade

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v3i1.152

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