DEMOCRACIA ROMANTIZADA, FRAGMENTAÇÃO POLÍTICA E O DECLÍNIO DO GOVERNO NORTE-AMERICANO

Richard Pildes

Resumo


A romantização democrática norte-americana contribui para a disfuncionalidade das instituições de seu governo, ou, ao menos, é o que alega este artigo. Três linhas de pensamentos que modelam esse argumento são desenvolvidas. Primeiro, para entender a paralisia do atual governo norte-americano, é tão importante focar o problema da “fragmentação política”, quanto a extrema polarização dos partidos políticos. Por fragmentação, compreendo a difusão interna do poder político que se distancia das lideranças partidárias e se aproxima das mãos de seus membros individualmente, mas também a difusão externa do poder, distanciando-se dos partidos em direção a organizações não-partidárias. A polarização política de hoje é um produto de um processo histórico de longo prazo e possivelmente duradouro; como resultado, acordos que atravessam linhas partidárias são mais prováveis de vir de líderes de partidos, que possuem o forte incentivo de manter a legenda partidária atraente ao maior eleitorado possível. Mas líderes de partidos só conseguem fazer isso se puderem pressionar seus membros recalcitrantes a se juntar ao acordo; a fragmentação política torna isso mais difícil de se alcançar. Além disso, a revolução das comunicações e a captação de fundos online agora permite que os representantes funcionem mais como empresários independentes do que no passado. Segundo, a ímpar cultura democrática e o desenho institucional norte-americanos contribuem para a fragmentação política. Nosso sistema é muito mais individualista e populista, em sua estrutura, do que o de outras democracias maduras. Leis de financiamento de campanhas, por exemplo, são mais baseadas na ideia de um sistema de eleições individualista e centrado no candidato, do que naquela em que as organizações centrais da política – os partidos políticos – desempenham um papel central. Na particular versão norte-americana da “responsabilidade democrática”, nossos mandatários estão sujeitos a eleições mais frequentes, contemplando-se as primárias, do que representantes eleitos em qualquer outro lugar; nós elegemos muito mais agentes, incluindo-se juízes e promotores, do que qualquer outro país; muitos de nossos esforços para reformas políticas perseguem um maior papel participativo de cidadãos individualmente. Grande parte das atuais propostas para mudar o financiamento de campanhas eleitorais, por exemplo, busca fortalecer “pequenos doadores” ou conceder vouchers a cidadãos, individualmente, que eles podem usar para financiar candidatos. Porém, há motivos para temer que tais práticas alimentarão a fragmentação política e dificultarão a governança efetiva, à medida que doações individuais tendem a desaguar em candidatos ideologicamente mais extremos e polarizados. Terceiro, uma direção distinta para reforma buscaria fortalecer as forças do centrismo e focar mais o poder de organizações do que o poder de indivíduos. Para resistir à fragmentação política, esforços para reforma podem procurar fortificar o papel de partidos políticos e líderes de partidos, de modo que membros individualmente terão menos do que um efetivo poder de veto. Este artigo sugere várias políticas específicas diferentes na área do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais que podem fazer isso ao conferir um papel mais relevante aos partidos políticos no sistema de financiamento de campanhas.

Palavras-chave


Direito Constitucional; Teoria Democrática; Partidos Políticos; Financiamento de Campanhas Eleitorais; Polarização

Texto completo:

PDF PDF (English)

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v3i1.156

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Direitos autorais 2017 Richard Pildes



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