UNDERSTANDING INFORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Auteurs

  • Stephen M. Griffin Tulane University

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v1i1.24

Mots-clés :

Constitutional Theory, American Constitutionalism, Constitutional Change, Constitutional Amendments, Informal Constitutional Change

Résumé

Amid much recent American work on the problem of informal constitutional change, this article stakes out a distinctive position. I argue that theories of constitutional change in the US must address the question of the relationship between the “small c” and “big C” Constitution and treat seriously the possibility of conflict between them. I stress the unavoidable role the text of the Constitution and structural doctrines of federalism and separation of powers play in this relationship and thus in constitutional change, both formal and informal. I therefore counsel against theories that rely solely on a practice-based approach or analogies between “small c” constitutional developments and British or Commonwealth traditions of the “unwritten” constitution and constitutional “conventions.” The alternative I advocate is to approach constitutional change from a historicist perspective that focuses attention on state building and the creation of new institutional capacities. This approach will allow us to make progress by highlighting that there can be multiple constitutional orders in a given historical era, thus accounting for the conflictual nature of contemporary constitutional development in the US.

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Biographie de l'auteur

Stephen M. Griffin, Tulane University

W.R. Irby Chair and Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School, USA

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Publiée

2016-01-31

Comment citer

Griffin, S. M. (2016). UNDERSTANDING INFORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. REI - REVISTA ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS, 1(1), 1–37. https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v1i1.24

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