WHAT IS A REALIST THEORY OF LAW?

Autores

  • Brian Leiter Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy & Human Values, University of Chicago.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v6i1.454

Palavras-chave:

Filosofia do Direito, Jurisprudência, Teoria do Direito

Resumo

This essay offers a programmatic statement for a realist theory of law.  Although I have been influenced by (and written about) the work of earlier American, Scandinavian, Italian and other legal realists, this is not an essay about what others have thought.   This is an essay about what I take realism about law to mean and what its theoretical commitments are; I shall use other realists to sometimes illustrate the distinctive positions of a realist theory of law, but will make clear where I depart from them. A realist theory of law involves both a “realist” and a “naturalistic” perspective on law.  Let me explain how I understand these perspectives.

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Referências

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Publicado

2020-04-25

Como Citar

Leiter, B. (2020). WHAT IS A REALIST THEORY OF LAW?. REI - REVISTA ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS, 6(1), 334–345. https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v6i1.454

Edição

v. 6 n. 1 (2020)

Seção

Artigos Internacionais

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